On his blog, Dan Walsh writes about a study done by Kirill Ermakov about SELinux as applied to a vulnerable Apache web server. The study found that even with SELinux protections, an attacker could still read /etc/passwd. Walsh: "This points out what most people do not understand about SELinux. SELinux does not necessarily block errors in applications from happening. SELinux will just contain them. If you are able to subvert the Apache application then you can become the Apache application and will have the rights allowed to the apache application. In his examples he was able to take over the Apache server and do what an apache server needs to do, including reading the /etc/passwd file." Walsh goes on to list several other things that could have been tested as they would be blocked by the SELinux rules (e.g. connecting to the mail port, reading random user files). In addition, he points out some ways that administrators could increase the SELinux containment of a web server.